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Abstract
This paper aim to prove positive correlations between local banking, industry, in-
novation, and growth in the French classical period (1880-1913). Empirical works
on GDP per capita growth gives positive correlation with local banking indicator.
The relation is all the more strong since local banking tied on non agricultural eco-
nomies. Thus, we open the black box and give evidence of local banking connection
with innovation. We set the proof through panel data analysis on a spacial basis.
Regard to so called German and English banks performances, local knowledge is a
key point of industrialization, at least in the French experience.
1 Introduction
Assuming universal banks as a key component of German industrializa-
tion, Gerschenkron (1962) introduced a long lasting controversy on ﬁnancial
institutions and economic growth relationship. In his view, backward econo-
mies are all the more able to catch up richest countries since they adopt adap-
ted centralized devices of development. German universal bank was thus the
perfect intermediary as it might centralized and used information to launch
industrial projects. As a matter of fact, because of academic inertias Ger-
man and English banking are still used as ideal types of the "good" and
the "bad" banking behavior of this time. From this point of view, so called
German universal banks helped ﬁnancing industrial investment while English
"speculative" joint stock banks hampered industrial development. Also, the
debate was not limited to European comparison as Calomiris (1995) rein-
forced the academic position of German banking structure, comparing spe-
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cialized American banks performances "in the mirror of" so called German
banking system.
However, some new contributions in economic history point out the aca-
demic overconﬁdence about German universal banks. New empirical works,
see for instance Fohlin (1998 & 1999) and Edwards & Ogilvie (1996), gave
evidence of the Gerschenkron's mistake, rejecting so called board represen-
tation advantages. Thus, German banks may not be as good as expected
in industrial (large scale) funding. In the same time Capie & Collins (1999)
elevated the English banking reputation. They showed for instance that joint
stock banks were able to support their industrial clients in period of distress.
The evolution of debates is therefore smoothing German advantage. Anyway,
English and German banking structure were still diﬀerent. As English ban-
king composed of large banks while German one got more local inﬂuence,
German advantage, if any, should come from information management (Cf.
Guinnane 2001). Indeed, According to Stein (2002) local knowledge mana-
gement is more diﬃcult into large and national multi-branch banks. English
banks were thus urged to supply "hard" short term credits while German
banks might provided "soft" industrial loans 1.
On this respect, as it is a composition of English and German bank type
the French banking system of the classical period (1880-1913) might shed
some lights on the debate. In one side local banks acted like universal banks
as local statement and private knowledge helped them providing adequate
services to their clients. Local banks were however subject to economic cycle
and sectorial ﬂuctuation. At the opposite, French deposit banks (Crédit Lyon-
nais, Société Générale & Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris) took advantage of
economies of scale to provide diversiﬁed short run loans. On this respect,
French deposit banks are often compared to English joint stock banks be-
cause of their high prudence and their large scale businesses. Comparing per-
formances of both kind of banks should conﬁrm or reject the Gerschenkron
position. Results should also speak on the implication of tight connections
between banks and industry in the process of economic development.
Thereby, this paper assesses economic eﬀects of both French commercial
bank types. The inquiry should tell more on eﬀectiveness of each structure.
We thus check for local banking and industrial activities correlations. We use
to this end an indicator of industrial production growth in one hand and an
indicator of innovation on the other. As we will see, causality is not a point
of concern as we think of signiﬁcant correlation might be usefully handled
1. "hard and "soft" refer to microeconomics of banking literature. "hard" credits imply
more quantitative information while "soft" credits entail private and hardly transferable
information (see Petersen 2004 for examples and evidences).
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to give evidence on local banking ability to promote economic development.
Accuracy of results depend thus on local banking indicator we use and the
control variables we add in the empirical framework. Hence, implementing
the best econometric estimator is not the turning point of this work, we
rather have to build the adequate model regard to the historical pattern of
the French banking system.
We therefore built ratios comparing local and deposit banks market share
and faced them to GDP growth and innovation variables. As systematic in-
formation on individual patent are lacking in the French system we estimated
innovation through the tax on patents. This one get however the advantage
to take account on patent's expected value, what is very important in such
inquiry (Cf. Griliches 1990). We ﬁnally get a couple of outcomes : ﬁrst, inno-
vation and GDP growth are positively correlated with local banking. Second,
the relation with the latter is all the more high since we look on industrial
areas.
Consequently, local banks are more able than deposit banks to ﬁnance
investment and innovation, models say. According to the expected causality
a couple of interpretation is possibly at play. First, as innovative ﬁrms often
need to invest, local banks knowledge helps providing funds to investment.
Second, local banks knowledge gives credit availability and bring about ﬁrms'
selection. This process keeps promising and innovating ﬁrms alive. Anyway, as
long as innovation and investment are related to industry, local banks should
promote GDP growth into industrial areas. This point is well corroborated
by empirical facts. As a result, the French experience gives evidence of local
banks superiority in the process of industrialization and lastly brings clues
on the "Gerschenkron's debate".
Section 2 reminds local banking, innovation and growth literature. Section
3 deals with the French banking structure. Section 4 presents the empirical
strategy. Section 5 provides sources and basic statistics. Section 6 gives the
results. Section 7 brings interpretation. Section 8 adds some discussions. Sec-
tion 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
The question we are speaking about here can basically be divided upon
two diﬀerent ﬁelds of research. The ﬁrst one deals with credit constraints as
a result of the bank size, the second one entails relationship banking and
innovation.
Stein (2002) provides a key framework on the ﬁrst point. According to the
size of the bank, the information need to allocate assets between branches
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diﬀer. Higher the size, numerous are the intermediaries, higher transparent
clients needing. Therefore small ﬁrms are less able to borrow to large banks.
At the opposite, as they have local and private knowledge, small banks are
better business partners. Here, the headquarter grabs information and takes
decisions in the same time what prevent information ineﬃciencies. Empirical
analyses give evidence of this point as hierarchical banks use more credit
scoring and impersonal interactions (Cf. Berger & al. 2005 and Uchida & al.
2006).
A new set of literature is emerging about geographical and cultural dis-
tance. Distance from headquarters especially matters as information quality
dwindles with it. For instance, Even though eﬀects melt down with new com-
munication technologies, physical distance in United States reduces banks
ability to lend to small and opaque ﬁrms (Petersen & Rajan 2002). Also,
for Berger & DeYoung (2006) the cost and proﬁt eﬃciency of multi-branch
banks wanes with physical distance from the parent bank. lastly, Alessandrini
et al. (2006) ﬁnd that small ﬁrms suﬀer from both cultural and physical dis-
tance on a sliding scale with the share of banks headquartered in the distant
province.
On other hand, many works give evidence on credit constraints obstacle to
innovation (see for instance Mohnen & Roller 2005). As innovations need in-
vestments to start projects, credit constraints hamper innovative businesses.
Because of its industrial districts, the "third Italy" is thus the perfect topic
on this point. For instance, Herrera & Minetti (2007) gives evidence of rela-
tionship banking ability to enhance product innovation probability in Italy.
In the same way, Alessandrini & al. (2007) proves that opacity due to physi-
cal distance hinders innovation. All in all, innovation from small and medium
size ﬁrms depends on credit access as the Italian examples said us.
3 The French banking structure
Local banks, deposit banks and the Banque de France are the main actors
of the French banking system. Local banks are of quite small size and provide
"universal" services to their clients. Either limited to speciﬁc areas or spe-
ciﬁc sector of activities, local bank business is not diversiﬁed and subject to
exogenous chocks. Even though some get few branches, this point is the main
source of concern for them. Local banks often do business inside industrial
districts and small business areas. Therefore, as they grab local and private
knowledge they easily cope with information asymmetry (See Petersen &
Rajan 1995, Boot 2001, Stein 2002 and Berger & al. 2005 for theoretical
and empirical evidence). Though close to universal bank type, local banks
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in France did not played the same (so called) role than large universal bank
in Germany. Unlike German universal banks, French local banks were rarely
involved in board representation and business direction. The common feature
is rather the ability to reduce asymmetries by gathering information. In other
words, universal banking activities might help pooling useful knowledge (into
local areas and speciﬁc sectors) and granting higher return in industrial (long
term) ﬁnance (Cf. Nishimura 1995 and Lescure & Plessis 2004 for empirical
evidence on long term industrial credits in the French experience).
By 1880, the sum of local bank branches reach 91% of all commercial
bank branches. This ﬁgure declines to reach 66% in 1910. Two facts trigge-
red this outcome. First, many new bank branches were set up due to deposit
bank expansion. Second, weak local banks collapsed by subsequent competi-
tion (Bazot 2010). All in all, local activities and local knowledges protected
surviving local banks. Failing bankers were consequently those in line with
deposit bank businesses.
by 1890 the French banking system is subject to deposit banks booming.
All French areas get new deposit bank branches. For, instance, the Société
Générale set up more than 400 branches along twenty years. Though quite
smaller the ﬁgure turns to 200 branches in the Crédit Lyonnais' case. As
suggested by the name, deposit banks grab massive deposits. Short term
activities is therefore the consequence of this feature. Besides, unlike local
banks, they are not close to their clients and get only basic information about
them. This is also why deposit banks are highly prudent banking actors. As
inquired by Lescure (2009) discounting safe bills is their main credit device.
Unlike local banks, advance in account are rarely accepted and renewed.
Somewhat like English joint stock banks, they are involved in commercial
rather than industrial credits.
Basically, two diﬀerent ﬁeld of business are shared by the French banking
actors. Industry is the one of local banks whereas deposit banks acted on
commercial activities. Theoretically, local banks are thus probably more use-
ful as capital accumulation spurs GDP growth, one might say. Though this
point of view may be coherent, two questions remain. First, how to prove it ?
second, if it is true, why deposit bank "victory" ?
We get some tracks on the second issue. Business interests of deposit
banks are not tied with those of economic development. In other words, they
make proﬁts without doing business with 'leading growth' sectors. Further-
more, a couple of competition is at play in banking sector. Even though local
banks are competitive in industrial "unsafe" credit, economies of scales give
advantage to deposit banks in grabbing deposits and providing "safe" loans.
Therefore, local banks proﬁts decrease when backing on risks with safe cre-
dits. As local banks are not enough diversiﬁed, exogenous shocks are now
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more able to kill them. In other hand, as local banks are proved to be more
designed to spur growth, such theory might be the proof of market failure.
Let's lastly speak about the Banque de France. For a couple of reasons, the
Banque is a turning point of the French banking system of that time. First, at
the turn of the century, the Banque gets an early central banking position. By
helping distressing ﬁrms and banks, it therefore turns to be countercyclical.
Second, its network of branches brings about credit development nationwide
(Bazot 2010). Though credit development is academically claimed to be posi-
tively related with economic growth, one might reject such arguments in this
present case. Since local actors are used to transmit the Banque policy, as
long as local banks are not prove to trigger economic development, beneﬁts
from credit development do not necessarily outweigh potential losses.
As some controversies depend on it, the economic eﬀect of local banking
is an important question. On this respect, the empirical strategy we will use
now is of high importance.
4 Empirical strategy
Causal models in macroeconomics are quite diﬃcult to implement as en-
dogenous biases are often at play. Furthermore, instrumental variables are
not systematically available, especially in historical inquiries. The empirical
strategy is therefore the turning point of the demonstration. Good handling
of correlation is sometime more accurate than poor causality as long as is the
relation not driving by omitted variable bias. Also, regressions with multiple
explicative variables are used to face this issue. Models are either panel or
cross-section econometrics.
A nice empirical device need to compare and tell what bank type is the
best promoter of economic development. Founding accurate indicator of eco-
nomic development is therefore the ﬁrst step. GDP per capita is traditionally
used to this end but interpretations are often hampered by omitted variables.
Nonetheless, good handling of results bring precision to correlations and help
seizing useful information. Moreover, since innovation is now seen as central
for economic development (Aghion & Howitt 1998) it is a variable of interest.
This is all the more true since investment, innovation and industry are often
interlocked in a same dynamics.
Producing adequate variables on relative banking size is the second step.
The number of local bank branches compared to deposit bank branches is
an easy ratio. Although useful in panel data regressions the late deposit
bank boom makes it tricky to use in cross-sectional tests. In fact, many dé-
partements are devoid of deposit banks in 1880. We might nevertheless use
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ending values of the ratio (those of 1911) but results might be uninterpre-
table. Anyway, other calculation are possibles. Given deposit banks business
pattern, diﬀerence of local bank branches per capita divided by the one of
deposit bank branches per capita from 1881 to 1911 is another nice ratio.
Few reasons conﬁrm this choice. First, the level of activity is controlled by
the number of inhabitant. Second, the ratio helps seizing local legitimacy
of local banks. If the ﬁgure of local bank branches is high in 1881 whereas
their activities are close to the ones of deposit bank, the ratio should be
negative. Indeed, such local banks should collapse as the number of deposit
bank rises up. Third, higher the ratio higher the usefulness of local banking.
As deposit bank branches rises up in every départements competition should
tackling all unspeciﬁc local bank businesses. Even if GDP growth and inno-
vation keep old local banks alive new local bank branches are set up as their
are not tackled by deposit bank businesses. Nevertheless, as very negative
ratio's ﬁgures might stem from convexity eﬀect the ratio is quite imperfect.
Even though business structure of the area is not opposed to local banking
features so much the ratio is very negative as local bank branches dwindles
whereas deposit bank branches increases slightly.
Therefore, in order to bring more evidence on results we must alterna-
tively use other ratios and other devices. First, the diﬀerence in local bank
branches per inhabitant minus the one of deposit bank branches per inhabi-
tant from 1881 to 1911 divided by the number of bank branches per inhabi-
tant in 1881 is an alternative ratio. We might used the mere time and banking
type diﬀerences but high initial bank size ﬁgures should bring convexity in
ratio's value. Then, features of the ﬁrst banking structure ratio hold though
corrected by the initial banking size. Also, the underlined bias of the ﬁrst
banking structure ratio is solved. As this new ratio helps more taking into
account local and deposit bank substitution eﬀect, it is thus more able to
ﬁgure out the French banking structure of the period. Anyway similar re-
sults whatever the ratio at play should conﬁrm the shape of conclusions 2.
Second, we might put in a same regression the diﬀerence along the period of
local and deposit bank branches per inhabitant. Third, comparison of results
whether we use local bank branches and total bank branches per inhabitant
is another possibility. As we will see all these diﬀerent strategies are useful
in diﬀerent part of this inquiry.
Producing models is the third step. Let's call 'GDP' the GDP per ca-
pita, 'NAP' the non-agricultural production per capita, 'INN' the indicator
2. the second banking structure ratio is obviously better but we run out our tests with
both ratios to bring more grounds to the conclusion
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of innovation 3, 'LOC' the ﬁgure of local bank branches, DEP the one of de-
posit bank branches, BK the one of all bank branches, POP the population.
First models use cross section regressions to assess GDP per capita and non-
agricultural production per capita growth according to the banking structure.
We also use an interaction term as the conditional eﬀect of local banking
according to the size of industrial activities is the point of interest. Let's
note g1 = dt,t+1log(GDP ), g2 = dt,t+1log(NAP ), BS1 =
(
dt,t+1(LOC/POP )
dt,t+1(DEP/POP )
)
,
BS2 =
dt,t+1(LOC/POP )−dt,t+1(DEP/POP )
BKt/POPt
and lNAP = log(NAP ) + 2.5. Hence,
the models we test are :
gn,i = αBSk;i + γBSk,i ∗ lNAPi,t + λlNAPi,t +
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t + i (1)
With n=1,2 ; k=1,2 ; i the département index and j the control variables'
index.
gn,i =
∑
v
(αvBTv,i + γvBTv,i ∗ lNAPi,t)+λlNAPi,t+
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t+i (2)
With BTv the banking type indicator such that BT1 = dt,t+1
(
LOC
POP
)
and
BT2 = dt,t+1
(
DEP
POP
)
and v=1,2.
Whether local banking increases growth when join to industry comes with
the interaction term 4.
Second models use panel data to assess innovation according to banking
structure. We therefore built three diﬀerent tests :
INNi,t = a
(
LOC
DEP
)
i,t
+
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t + Tt + ui + ηi,t (3)
INNi,t = a
(
LOC
POP
)
i,t
+
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t + Tt + ui + ηi,t (4)
INNi,t = a
(
BK
POP
)
i,t
+
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t + Tt + ui + ηi,t (5)
T is a temporal dummy and u is the département dummy. The ﬁrst model
is explicative by itself. However, since the ﬁgure of deposit bank branches is
sometime 0 in 1880 the following models give robustness to the results. Second
3. Innovation is calculated by the patent tax as explain in the section 4 below.
4. NAP is not industry but non agricultural production, we simply assume here that
industrial districts are those with high level of non-agricultural production per capita. This
hypothesis is corroborated by historical and quantitative analyses (Cf. Combes & al. 2008
for evidence)
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and third models need to be interpreted together. Indeed, information comes
with comparison of results. For instance, local banking is good for innovation
as long as a positive and signiﬁcant in (4) but not signiﬁcant in (5).
What are control variables of the models ? Traditionally, control variables
are used to solve the omitted variable bias. We thus put inside the ﬁrst set of
regressions : the log of initial value of credit development, GDP per capita,
enterprise per capita, bank branches per capita and population density. As
the evolution of banking ﬁgures correlated with the one of credit development
we add credit development growth variable as well. Control variables of the
second set of regressions are : ﬁrms' average size and the share of non agri-
cultural production 5. This choice is motivated by supposedly high relation
between industry, ﬁrm size and innovation.
Now, let's present sources and basic statistical ﬁgures to bring more
grounds to the empirical strategy.
5 Sources and basic statistics
Innovation's indicator is the ﬁrst point of concern. We use to this end
the amount of the patent tax divided by the urban population. The tax gets
three main features. Annuities are constant so patent's owners pay 100F per
year of protection. The sum of annuities depends on the period of protection.
As the patent is protected for ﬁve, ten or ﬁfteen years, related tax are 500F,
1000F and 1500F. The patent is granted as long as the tax is paid and
the tax must be paid in advance. Lastly, if the patent sold, the remaining
amount of tax is totally paid in the département of the depositor. What are
the consequences of this system ? First, as 100F is an important amount in
XIXth century France, patents are of high value and the tax is thus relevant to
worth innovations. Second, as soon as patents are worthless owners stop pay
in for it. In other words, as long as the expected proﬁt of using the patent is
positive, the tax is paid. The tax helps thus taking account on patents value.
Third, the tax rules out cycles and shocks. Lastly, as innovations are often
made inside urban center, urban population is the perfect denominator.
Let's add two points. First, the département of Paris is withdrawn. Fo-
reign patents bias motivated this choice as foreigners must legally deposit
their patents in Paris. The tax is consequently composed by almost 2000 pa-
tents each year. Second, according to Lamoreaux & Sokoloﬀ (2001) several
inventors might deposit their patents in other areas. As we use ﬁxed eﬀect in
5. note we can not use credit development as data is lacking from 1891 to 1911. Further-
more, population appears in calculation of innovation's indicator. Control variables with
population are thus tricky to use. We however use them to check on outcomes' robustness.
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the econometric model, we just assume the phenomenon constant over time.
This point is not really concerning anyway as no room for "market inno-
vation" rose up in France. As Khan & Sokoloﬀ (2004) points it out, weak
examination of patents could not insure either its quality or its originality.
Firms were thus not incited to buy patents. This is all the more true since
monopoly protection was limited as information on patents were lacking 6.
As a proof, patents' cession are very weak in XIXth France. For instance,
the number of cession is equal to 36 in 1878 and 91 in 1898 7. Note also that
buyers and sellers belong mainly to the same département (more than 80%
in both cases as we let down transaction with foreigners). As ﬁrms bought
patents on production purpose, this last point has two consequences : it gives
evidence of local industry and innovation type interlocking ; it rules out any
'market for patent' bias from our empirical tests.
As the ratio imperfectly ﬁt with innovation (See Griliches 1990 for discus-
sion on patents) qualitative inquiries might be useful as well. Looking on the
"bulletin des lois" helped us knowing more about individual patents 8. First,
the share of companies' (sociétés) 9 is smooth and weak over time (almost
10% and less than 7% without Paris). Second, industrial patents are nume-
rous in industrial départements. For instance, the industrial département of
Grenoble is mainly composed of industrial patents from small and medium
ﬁrms and private inventors.
We got the additional data through diﬀerent sources. The INED website 10
provides the population ﬁgures per French département. Jobert (1991) gives
the business tax statistics. The Bottin du Commerce et de l'Industrie is used
to evaluate the number of bank branches. Credit development and GDP per
capita are provided by Bazot (2010) 11.
We get information for all ten years from 1881 to 1911. In other words,
the panel is composed of four years and 84 départements.
6. "The attempt to obtain information was also inhibited by restrictions placed on ac-
cess viewers had to state their motives ; foreigners had to be assisted by French attorneys ;
and no extract from the manuscript could be copied until the patent had expired." (Khan
& Sokoloﬀ 2004)
7. we include cessions to foreigners and patents retro-cessions in the calculation. Figures
dwindle dramatically as we withdraw those cases (22 in 1878 and 59 in 1898).
8. The "bulletin des lois" gives only information about the depositor if not represented
by an attorney and provides a very brief description of the patent.
9. Firm ﬁgures are available for companies only
10. www.ined.fr
11. Many thanks to Miren Lafourcade who tested the accuracy of our GDP estimation
given Toutain's calculation of 1862 and 1896 (see Combes & al., 2008). This test could not
be done by ourself as Toutain's data unavailable yet. According to the test our GDPs are
very similar to Toutain's one as R2 = 0.98 and 0.95 without Paris area.
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Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. Let's add some comments on
banking ﬁgures. Looking on branch evolution of both kind of bank is a ﬁrst
step of understanding. For instance, local banks set up more branches than
deposit banks in the highly industrial département of Grenoble from 1881 to
1911. This fact is similar in the département of Lille, Lyon and Le Havre. At
the opposite some rural départements are subject to this outcome as well.
The département of Lozère is a good example of such case. This fact proves
two points : ﬁrst, reverse causality between growth and ratios we use in the
econometric model is not actually high, second, on respect to the previous
facts the interaction term we put inside is all the more interesting since ratios'
ﬁgures are heterogeneous.
6 Results
This section is divided on two parts. We display results of the ﬁrst set of
regressions in one hand and results on innovation on the other.
6.1 Growth results
Whatever the tested model, all results converge to the same point. Local
banking is more correlated with growth than deposit banking. As we think
of the interaction term is of high importance, regressions are implemented
to compare results as this one included in or not. Table 2 and 3 gives the
results. Let's deal in ﬁrst with equation (1), GDP per capita growth and the
ﬁrst banking ratio. Coeﬃcients of interest are positives (α = 0.1 & γ = 0.05)
and signiﬁcants (pα = 0.001 & pγ = 0.04) whereas the whole model is quite
explicative since R2 = 0.46 (Cf. Figure 1 for marginal eﬀect graphs). Growth
is related with local banking and the relation is all the more strong since the
area is industrialized, results are suggesting. Note α = 0.04 & pα = 0.001
without interaction term while R2 = 0.41. Therefore, the interaction term
gives deﬁnitely more grounds to the results. What occurs as the banking
structure ratio shift ? The shape of result remains the same. Unlike with the
ﬁrst ratio, regression displays insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient as the interaction term
absent (pα = 0.26). However results keep the same shape when the interaction
term included. Coeﬃcients of interest are positives (α = 0.45 & γ = 0.25)
and signiﬁcants (pα = 0.002 & pγ = 0.009)
12 while the whole model is quite
12. Let's a short explanation of results. According to the graph about marginal eﬀect
of the second banking structure indicator on GDP per capita growth as the importance
of non agricultural production change, if an exogenous shock increases BS2 by 0.1 point
(what correspond to 1/30 of maxBS2 −minBS2) GDP per capita growth rises up by 3%
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explicative (R2 = 0.40). All in all, conclusions give evidence of local banking
and NAP size interlocking in the process of GDP per capita growth.
What is the shape of result as looking on NAP per capita growth and
the ﬁrst banking ratio. Coeﬃcients of interest are still positives (α = 0.11 &
γ = 0.06) and signiﬁcants (pα = 0.009 & pγ = 0.04) whereas the whole model
is quite less explicative than before R2 = 0.23 (Cf. Figure 2 for marginal eﬀect
graphs). Unlike previous result, banking coeﬃcient turns insigniﬁcant as the
interaction term withdrawn. In other words, local banking promotes NAP
per capita growth as long as initial NAP high. Using the other indicator
of banking structure provides very interesting results as well. Still, banking
coeﬃcient turns insigniﬁcant as the interaction term withdrawn. In other
words, looking on marginal eﬀect of BS2 on NAP per capita growth as lNAP
changes, gives evidence of the interaction interest 13.
All in all, results seem to rule out simultaneity bias as α insigniﬁcant
as long as the interaction term is withdrawn 14 This prove that economic
growth is more related to local banks than deposit banks at least on indus-
trial areas. Local banking and industry are thus strongly tied in the growth
process as marginal eﬀect graphs are suggesting. Long term loans, informa-
tion asymmetry and investment needs are probably the main aspects of the
phenomena.
Let's look on results with equation (2). First, deposit banking coeﬃcients
are never signiﬁcantly correlated with GDP and NAP per capita growth.
Second, local banking is positively correlated with GDP per capita growth
with and without interaction term. Third, the interaction term is signiﬁcant
as the dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. Fourth, local banking
is positively and signiﬁcantly related with NAP per capita growth as long
as local banking interaction term belong to the regression. R2 still rises up
dramatically as the interaction term is included in the model. To sum up,
those results conﬁrm the previous ones.
on the whole period as lNAP = 2 while it rises up by 0.9% as lNAP = 1. The eﬀect of
BS2 could even be negative as lNAP < 0.7 (what correspond to the 25 percentile point).
Note lastly that standard errors shape gives evidence of strong signiﬁcance of results.
13. according to the related graph, as it increases by 0.1 point, BS2 rises up NAP per
capita growth by 3% as lNAP = 2. Also, this outcome turns to 0.8% as lNAP = 1.
14. note also that, given the shape of the banking structure ratios, a bias exist if deposit
banks dependence to GDP per capita growth is diﬀerent to the one of local banks. Hence,
coeﬃcients are negatively biases as deposit banks dependence is superior to the one of local
banks. Also, coeﬃcients are positively biases in the opposite case. The direction of the bias
is quite diﬃcult to assess but it would be doubtful that simultaneity bias caused alone the
sign of the estimated coeﬃcients. On the contrary traditional literature on the topic gives
evidence of higher growth dependence of deposit banks, at least in the American case (see
for instance James 1981).
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6.2 Innovation results
Results go to similar direction about innovation. Innovation is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with the banking ratio as regression on equation
(3) is telling us (a = 0.45 & pa = 0.02). In other words, innovation is rela-
ted with the more local banking départements. Also, results of (4) and (5)
converge to this conclusion. Local bank branches per capita is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with innovation (a = 0.13 & pa = 0.06) while total
bank branches per capita is not (a = 0.10 & pa = 0.14). The more the local
banking market share, higher the innovation ﬁgures. Adding GDP per ca-
pita, enterprises per capita and population density do not change the results.
Lastly, bootstrapping tests do not bring about diﬀerences in results as well.
Results remain highly positive and signiﬁcant as we withdraw temporal
dummies. Also, the contrast is stronger as we compare results with (4) and
(5). Lastly, This point is highly encouraging according to the market for
patent issue. If such market was existing along the period both temporal
and geographical ﬁxed eﬀect should be highly signiﬁcant. Indeed, according
to Lamoreaux & Sokoloﬀ (2001), such market should dwindle signiﬁcantly
patent deposit share from rural areas.
Let's speak lastly about control variables. The share of industrial output
and ﬁrms average size are rarely signiﬁcant and often negatively correla-
ted with the indicator of innovation. Correlation with urbanized population
should be at play. It might prove also that probability to provide useful inno-
vation is not directly related with industrialization. Lastly, it might be due to
large industrial ﬁrms reluctance in providing information on their research.
However, if such points deep and large, ﬁxed eﬀects should critically change
the results, what is not the case here.
7 Interpretation of results
Why should local banks be more related with growing industry as results
are suggesting ? Information management is the key point of understanding.
Compare to deposit banks, because they belong to local businesses, local
banks get high aptitude to bring funds to riskier clients. Their knowledge re-
duces asymmetries of information and helps ﬁguring out ﬁrms values (Berger
& Udell 1996). They seize high value added projects and avoid anti selection
process. Furthermore, because of their local position local banks prevent mo-
ral hazard through reputation costs threat. In other hand, small size helps
facing unusual situations by adapting funds to client needs. All in all, ac-
curate knowledge gives local banks the ability to select the most promising
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ﬁrms of the area.
However, what credit devices were used ? According to Nishimura (1995)
local banks from industrial districts provided long term loans through bills
renewing and advance in account. Also, local knowledge helps them issuing
and dealing local companies' shares (Cf. Lescure & Plessis 2004). In other
words, unlike deposit banks, local banks were not limited to commercial cre-
dits 15. According to Lescure (2009), commercial portfolio in 1910 represent
50% of regional bank's 'other credits' and 120% of deposit bank ones. As long
term loans are speciﬁcally needed by industrial ﬁrms, such outcome conﬁrms
the higher local banks ability to lend to "modern" sectors.
Hence, why should local bank ﬁgures be correlated with innovation ones ?
the answer stems from industry, innovation and investment relations. Results
entail two possible explanation, depends on the causality direction. First, in-
novation exists before banking relations. Here, local banks help ﬁnancing
investment of the related project. Second, banking relation is anterior to in-
novation. As long as expected returns are related with invention and technical
improvement, local banks selection promotes (directly or not) this innovation.
7.1 Investment credit, local banking and innovation
This section deals with reverse causality. What therefore means the causa-
lity ? Here, is it because ﬁrms were innovative that local bank branches were
numerous compare to deposit bank ones ? In other words, does innovation
give advantage to local banking ? Because innovation entails investment, lo-
cal ﬁrms need long term loans. Unlike deposit banks, unable to provide such
funds, local banks are more suited to do business with innovative ﬁrms. As
banking proﬁt of the area depends on long term credits, local banks are
more proﬁtable here than outside. This might be one reason for innovation
and local banking correlation.
Obviously, as investment level depends more to industrial activities, we
should get positive correlation between industry, local banking and NAP
and GDP per capita growth as long as local banks eﬃcients. That is what
we found especially through interaction terms results. Therefore, innovative
ﬁrms from industrial areas get credit to local banks what increases invest-
ment, productivity and growth.
A quite diﬀerent story is however at play if we change the direction of
causality.
15. Archives of the Banque de France gives examples of deposit banks' exclusion from
local businesses. For instance, as the Banque de France chose to set up a branch in Cher-
bourg, inspectors reported the Société générales' inability of doing business with local
ﬁrms as proved by its small volume of credits.
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7.2 Bank relationship, selection and innovation
This second part deals with bank selection eﬀect. A couple of theories rises
up according to local bank lending abilities. Assume ﬁrst that local banks can
not provide funds to all proﬁtable ﬁrms of the area. Because they have good
private knowledges, local banks are however able to select those promising
highest expected return. As long as expected returns of local banks are related
to ﬁrms' dynamism, local banks select ﬁrms with highest innovative features.
Assume now that local banks are not constraints anymore. Since information
is costly to pool, they may choose to invest in relationship according ﬁrms
expected returns. Still, local banks select promising and innovative ﬁrms.
How bringing more ground to this thesis ? Because of credit constraints,
remaining ﬁrms should not be able to survive in the long run in both cases.
Hence, anything improving local banks lending ability should reduce the
bankruptcy rate. How to prove this point ? The answer entails two additional
issues. First, what observing fact might increase local banks lending on the
period ? Second, what model might underpin this fact ?
As argued by Bazot (2010) Banque de France branches helped local banks
coping with liquidity constraints as deposit banks rose up their business
network. Also, since deposit bank gleaned the Banque de France business,
this one was urge to ﬁnd new business partners, as well. In other words,
Banque branch transactions were particularly useful to local bankers and
vice-versa. Lescure (2003) reports that the rediscount portfolio was made up
of 83% of local bank bills in 1880 and 1910. Supply and demand were there
to celebrate the union. The Banque de France was thus highly incited to
enhance its branch network along the period.
Therefore, observing bankruptcy rate evolution due to Banque de France
geographical expansion is a good starting point 16. The model should also
implements interaction term to catch the point we are interesting for. The
testing model is so :
Bi,t = ζ
(
LOC
POP
)
i,t
+µBQi,t+ψ
(
LOC
POP
)
i,t
∗BQi,t+
∑
j
βjCONTi,j,t+Tt+ui+φi,t
(6)
BQi,t is the number of Banque de France branches divided by the dépar-
tement size. Control variables are : GDP per capita, innovation ratio, ﬁrm
average size and share of urbanized population. The bankruptcy rate (Bi,t)
is the number of bankruptcy per enterprise.
Regressions results are highly consistent with the hypothesis as ψ nega-
tives (= −0.16) and signiﬁcants (pψ = 0.02) (see table 4 and Figure 3). Also,
16. Bankruptcy data are available in the "Compte générale de la justice civile et com-
merciale".
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looking on regression [1], when it increases by 0.1 point (what correspond to
1/12 of max LOC
POP
− min LOC
POP
as calculated in thousand of inhabitant) ban-
kruptcy rate decreases by 1% as SUCC = 0.2 (50 percentile point). This
outcome turns to 0.6% as SUCC = 0.4 (80 percentile point). ζ is positive
(= 0.12) and signiﬁcant (pζ = 0.02), suggesting higher bankruptcy rate as
local banking business high. This fact ﬁts with the story we are telling about
as long term industrial credits are riskier than short term commercial ones.
In other words, credits to investment and innovation entail more risk so more
failure. Results are quite the same as we withdraw ﬁrm's average size and
share of urbanized population from the regression. Adding deposit bank per
inhabitant does not change the results whereas this variable is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant 17. Substituting ﬁxed eﬀect by random one does not change
the results as well.
7.3 Synthesis
Whatever the causality at play local banks bring about NAP per capita
growth, either through investment or selection of good projects. Let's speak
more on the overlapping case. It is indeed probable that both eﬀects play in
the same time. Assume that a invention leads a small ﬁrm 18 to invest in a new
project. Assume ﬁrst the investment costly. The ﬁrm can not avoid external
ﬁnance. It therefore asks for local bank help. Rising large funds entail either
bonds or share issues. The bank brings it help through diﬀerent ways. First,
it provides funds until bonds and shares are sold. As the period can be quite
long such loans entails some risks 19. The bank has thus to be sure of the ﬁrm
project. Second, it helps to deal bonds and shares using their local inﬂuence.
Third, it keeps some bonds and shares in vault. This third case is however
quite rare.
Assume now that ﬁrms can use its own funds to ﬁnance the investment.
However, raw materials and working capital entails massive demand of cre-
dit, sometimes for more than one year (Cf. Nishimura 1995). As the project
nascent, the bank has to know more on it, this is the reason why such credits
are most often provided by well informed insider lenders 20. Therefore, by
choosing or not to bring funds to the ﬁrm, the bank indirectly selects or not
the project 21.
17. results on request to the author
18. as empirical facts are suggesting, patents deposit was rarely done by companies.
19. there are risk due to liquidity shocks, moral hazard, diﬃculty of the ﬁrm and losses
of better opportunities
20. belonging to the same industrial districts
21. Note that if the innovative ﬁrm collapses the related patent is lost as the inventor
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The bank makes one of these choices (depends on circumstances) as long
as the project expected gain maximize its proﬁts according to the set of
information available. All in all, as the bank helps the ﬁrm to rise funds,
investment increases the ﬁrm productivity and its potential growth level.
Moreover, as the bank chooses the most promising projects the ﬁrm should
be good enough to generate new innovations in the future. There is thus a
couple of positive eﬀects in the long run.
8 Discussions
We would like to add few points of discussion. First, as the Banque de
France was a main actor of the banking system in the period, it might be
useful to assess its policy, given those new results. Second, might deposit
banks be assessed through this outcome. Third, do Paris district matter for
interpretation. Fourth, what this study might told on the Gerschenkron's
debate.
8.1 Assessing the Banque de France policy
In a recent contribution, Bazot (2010) gave evidence on Banque de France
branches ability to improve ﬁrm access to credit. The union with local banks
were also put in front of the demonstration. As the Banque only brought
liquidity to close actors, local banks could substitutes previous reserves with
safe discountable bills as soon as the Banque branch was built. Local banks
credits increased what reduced liquidity constraints in the area (as also do-
cumented in table 4). As this process was applied with local ﬁrms as well
(though scale weaker), ﬁrms were therefore urged to provide commercial cre-
dit to their clients. All in all, Banque branches increased credit development
in signiﬁcant way.
However, does such policy increased wealth ? Indeed, some feared that
local banking rescue keeps on the banking system with an archaic shape. As
deposit banks were the alternative to local banking at this time, the Banque
repel the ascent of the former by keeping alive the latter. This point is thus
strongly related with the present inquiry. Since we proved that local banks
were more able to bring about innovation and growth, at least in industrial
areas, Banque de France policy was part of this success. Unless credit de-
velopment played negatively on economic growth in the same time (what
can not pay for it. This fact is however caught by our data as we use the tax rather than
raw patent number.
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seems improbable), the Banque de France policy probably helped promoting
industrialization.
8.2 What about deposit banks ?
Even though local banking is more able to trigger economic development,
the assessment of deposit bank needs a reappraisal. First deposit banks are
part of the system so their position inﬂuenced the one of other banks. As do-
cumented by Lescure (2009), local banks change their asset portfolios because
of deposit banks constraint. Indeed, local banks mainly provided commercial
credits before 1890's. The trend shift as deposit banks used their speciﬁc
advantage to take up this business. Thereby, local banks provided riskier
(industrial) loans from this point of time as deposit bank competition rises
up.
The same argument might be used regarding Banque de France policy.
Deposit bank still triggered the Banque de France union with local banks
so that any positive eﬀect of the Banque branches policy has to be assessed
according to this fact. Thus, industrial ﬁnance we documented here might
indirectly depend to deposit banks expansion of the late XIXth.
8.3 Paris issue
All results we got withdrew the Paris' district. Thus, is this choice entails
some biases and unobserved eﬀects reducing the quality of interpretation ?
As Paris is the main city of patent deposit one might argue that the empirical
work inquires for half of the phenomenon only. Though this remark correct,
adding Paris to regressions enhances estimations quality. Indeed, Paris gets
many local banks which the ﬁgure grows up on the period. Adding Paris in
the data generates isolated points, in spite of ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, this choice
might have ﬁnally played against us.
Another bias might stem from the gap between Paris and the rest of
France. One could argue that Paris provided the elite to the rest of the
country. Moreover, innovation from Paris might be the most important ones.
The ﬁrst issue does not matter actually as the important point is not the
whole innovation process but the relation between local banking, innovation,
investment and industrial productivity. The second issue is solved through
qualitative analysis. Observing patent description as told in the "bulletin des
lois" brings information on patents types and their expected inﬂuence. For
instance, patents for commercial purposes should be less inﬂuent than indus-
trial ones. Accurate inquiry of the source gave no evidence of outperforming
patents in Paris.
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8.4 English and German banks eﬃciency
What can be add to the Gerschenkron's debate on the light of this new
study. As the English banking system very concentrated, results suggest Ger-
man advantage through information management. On this respect, traditio-
nal argument are let down. Hence, German banking structure might be good
in promoting growth because of its ability to know more on industrial needs.
As told by the present model, industrial ﬁnance bring growth about through
selection process. Representation to ﬁrm's board does not matter anymore
since banks trigger industrial progress by selection of the most promising
ﬁrms (and projects). This point might thus be done neither by inﬂuencing
ﬁrms direction nor by providing massive credit loans.
However, comparison is quite tricky. Local banks speciﬁcities are nume-
rous. For instance, local knowledge is probably higher for French local banks
than German universal banks. Moreover, English joint stock banks were pro-
bably less "timorous" than French deposit banks. As far as we know, En-
glish banks got more credit tools to bring about industrial progress. For
instance, English banks rarely provided loans through commercial discount
device (Cf. Lescure 2009). In other hand, each banking system is speciﬁc
and follow its own path. For instance, Although well suited to ﬁnance small
industries (Guinnane 2001), German credit cooperatives have no business
room in France and England.
As a consequence, German advantage, if any, might stem from close in-
dustrial connection. At the opposite, English disadvantage, if any, might be
related to 'distance' 22 with ﬁrms. But we must stay prudent as both might
depend on remaining national institutions (Cf. Hall and Soskice 2001 for an
introduction on this point). Therefore, institutions interlocking might brings
more clues on reasons of banking speciﬁcities, preventing any conclusion wi-
thout deep inquiry about national global structures.
9 Conclusion
This paper argues that banking structure matter for development in
France. We especially show dramatic local banking inﬂuence on this res-
pect. This result is not due to local banks size but stem from their ability to
gather and use information. At the opposite, deposit banks structure prevent
them to get precise information particularly needs to lend into "complex" en-
vironments. Therefore, because industrial credits are uncertain per se, local
banks were so relatively more apt to sustain industrial projects. On this res-
22. distance is either cultural or geographical but the former is probably more at stake.
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pect, innovation and local banking relationship is the empirical justiﬁcation
of such theoretical position.
Conclusions are hard to transpose but they might shed some lights on
the eﬃcient banking structure debate. For instance, as German banking sys-
tem was more dispersed than English one, German industrial success might
come from information management rather than speciﬁc features of German
universal banks. Credit cooperative were thus more likely to have inﬂuential
position in the German industrialization process. On the other hand, as infor-
mation management depends on the bank size, bank mergers might hampers
innovative projects. It is all the more true since national industries belong
to industrial districts whose information do not get out. Thus, large banks
are not necessarily the best economic option as they have no ability to grab
local and precious knowledges.
On the other hand, this paper gives evidence of possible banking market
ineﬃciency. This point stem from the banking market per se as competition
emerges from deposit and credit side. On this respect, even though local
banks have the ability to sustain innovation, investment and growth due to
speciﬁc advantages on credit market side, they are not able to compete on
deposit market side. Therefore, some local banks might suﬀer from liqui-
dity constraints due to competition on deposits and safe (liquid) commercial
credits.
Lastly, according to transaction cost theory, present transaction costs re-
duction (especially through information and communications technologies)
might diminish ﬁrms average size by allocating a wide part of the production
to specialized SMEs. Furthermore, by introducing congestion costs into mo-
dels of economic geography Krugman & Venables (1995) designed a theoreti-
cal path for sectoral diversiﬁcation as empirically showed by Imbs &Wacziarg
(2003). Therefore, sectors diversiﬁcation and ﬁrms decentralisation should
enhance the ﬁgure of innovative SMEs in the future. The way those ﬁrms
will improve their productivity and reduce their costs is thus an important
issue. Since small and medium size ﬁrms are hard to survey quantitatively,
speciﬁc knowledges are needed to ﬁnance them. As a consequence, according
to this contribution, local banking activities should potentially perform new
ﬁnancial solutions in the future.
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics : mean and standard deviation
1880 1890 1900 1910
Innovation ratio 0.40 0.32 0.26 0.24
[0.33] [0.34] [0.22] [0.26]
LOC/DEP 19.4 13.9 5.0 2.6
[10.1] [7.7] [3.6] [1.8]
Local bank per capita 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.56
[0.27] [0.24] [0.24] [0.25]
Deposit bank per capita 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.24
[0.02] [0.03] [0.08] [0.09]
Bankruptcy rate 0.25 0.34 0.36 0.28
[0.12] [0.14] [0.16] [0.12]
GDP per capita 0.57 0.61 0.72 0.74
[0.17] [0.19] [0.23] [0.21]
Firms average size 0.62 0.71 0.85 0.77
[0.22] [0.24] [0.30] [0.27]
urbanized pop share 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32
[0.14] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17]
Enterprise per capita 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.56
[0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11]
NAP share 0.49 0.56 0.60 0.57
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14]
BS1 BS2 BT1 BT2
Mean -0.082 -0.37 -0.037 0.21
SD [1.42] [0.46] [0.24] [0.09]
g1 g2 SUCC
Mean 0.33 0.51 0.37
SD [0.17] [0.23] [1.02]
N=84 for each year. NAP is non agricultural production. LOC/DEP is the number of local bank branches
per deposit bank branches. Innovation ratio is the tax per hundred of urbanized inhabitants. Local bank
per capita is the number of local bank branches per ten thousands inhabitants. Deposit bank per capita
is the number of deposit bank branches per ten thousands inhabitants. Bankruptcy rate is the number
of bankruptcy per hundred of enterprises. GDP per capita is GDP/10000 per capita. Firms average size
is the non agricultural production per ten enterprises. Enterprise per capita is the number of ﬁrms per
hundred of inhabitants. BS1, BS2, BT1 and BT2 are deﬁned in Table 2. g1 is GDP per capita growth
from 1881 to 1911 and g2 is non agricultural production per capita growth on the same period. SUCC is
the Banque de France branches density (per 10000Ha).
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Figure 1  Banking structure marginal eﬀect on GDP per capita growth as
initial level of non agricultural production change
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Table 2  Determinant of GDP per capita growth from 1881 to 1911
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BS1 0.04*** 0.10***
[0.01] [0.03]
BS2 0.05 0.45***
[0.04] [0.13]
BT1 0.29*** 0.58***
[0.06] [0.19]
BT2 0.42 0.25
[0.26] [0.71]
BS1*lNAP 0.05**
[0.02]
BS2*lNAP 0.25***
[0.09]
BT1*lNAP 0.24*
[0.14]
BT2*lNAP -0.01
[0.58]
lNAP 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.16
[0.16] [0.15] [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16]
R2 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.46
N 84 84 84 84 84 84
***, **, * signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence, standard errors into brackets. OLS
regressions on département basis from 1881 to 1911. BS1 is the ﬁrst "banking structure"
ratio. It is the diﬀerence from 1880 to 1910 of the number of local bank branches per
inhabitant divided by the diﬀerence from 1880 to 1910 of the number of deposit bank
branches per inhabitant. BS2 is diﬀerence from 1880 to 1910 of the number of local bank
branches per inhabitant minus the diﬀerence from 1880 to 1910 of the number of deposit
bank branches per inhabitant. BT1 is the ﬁrst bank type ratio. It is the diﬀerence from
1880 to 1910 of the number of local bank branches per inhabitant. BT2 is the diﬀerence
from 1880 to 1910 of the number of deposit bank branches per inhabitant. lNAP is the
log of non agricultural production in 1880. All regressions add credit development growth
(1881/1911) variable and the log of initial (1881) ﬁgure of : credit development, bank
branches per capita, population density and enterprise per capita.
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Figure 2  Banking structure marginal eﬀect on non agricultural production
per capita growth as initial level of non agricultural production change
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Table 3  Determinant of NAP per capita growth from 1881 to 1911
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BS1 0.02 0.11***
[0.02] [0.03]
BS2 0.05 0.45**
[0.05] [0.17]
BT1 0.21** 0.53**
[0.09] [0.25]
BT2 0.44 0.53
[0.38] [1.26]
BS1*lNAP 0.06**
[0.02]
BS2*lNAP 0.26**
[0.11]
BT1*lNAP 0.25
[0.19]
BT2*lNAP 0.12
[0.89]
lNAP -0.20 -0.11 -0.20 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14
[0.26] [0.25] [0.26] [0.25] [0.26] [0.24]
R2 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.23
N 84 84 84 84 84 84
***, **, * signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence, standard errors into brackets.
OLS regressions on département basis from 1881 to 1911. NAP is the non agricultural
production. All regressions add credit development growth (1881/1911) variable and the
log of initial (1881) ﬁgure of : credit development, bank branches per capita, population
density and enterprise per capita.
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Table 4  Innovation and local banking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LOC/DEP 0.84*** 0.54*** 0.52** 0.42*
[0.15] [0.14] [0.25] [0.23]
ﬁxed vs random random ﬁxed random ﬁxed
temporal dummies no no yes yes
R2 within 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18
N 296 296 296 296
(5) (6) (7) (8)
LOC/POP 0.22*** 0.15* 0.16*** 0.13*
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07]
ﬁxed vs random random ﬁxed random ﬁxed
temporal dummies no no yes yes
R2 within 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.19
N 336 336 336 336
(9) (10) (11) (12)
BK/POP -0.02 -0.05 0.14** 0.10
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
ﬁxed vs random random ﬁxed random ﬁxed
temporal dummies no no yes yes
R2 within 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.18
N 336 336 336 336
***, **, * signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence, standard errors into brackets. All
regressions add ﬁrm average size and share of non agricultural production.
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Figure 3  Local banking marginal eﬀect on GDP per capita growth as
succursale's density change according to regression (1) and (2)
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Table 5  Bankruptcy, Banque de France branches and local banking
(1) (2)
LOC/POP 0.12** 0.11**
[0.05] [0.05]
(LOC/POP)*SUCC -.013** -.017***
[0.007] [0.006]
SUCC 0.06 0.08*
[0.05] [0.05]
R2 within 0.35 0.33
N 336 336
***, **, * signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% conﬁdence, standard errors into brackets. (1)
adds GDP per capita, urbanized population share, ﬁrm average size and innovation
indicator while (2) adds only GDP per capita, innovation indicator and urbanized
population share. Both regressions adds geographical and temporal dummies.
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